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INTRODUCTION 
Permanent injunctions are powerful remedies.  Compared to other 
forms of relief, they can even be called extraordinary.1  When entered, 
they order defendants to cease the conduct that created their liability 
absolutely.  Paired with the threat of contempt, parties who contravene 
them risk criminal condemnation.  In a sense, a plaintiff requesting 
injunctive relief is effectively asking the court to draft a criminal statute 
for that single plaintiff’s benefit and to that single defendant’s 
detriment.2  Given permanent injunctions’ potency, it should come as no 
surprise that some believe that courts should reserve injunctions for 
only the most exceptional circumstances.3   
Yet, judicial reluctance to grant permanent injunctions is not 
mandated by the Copyright Act.  To the contrary, 17 U.S.C. § 502(a) 
confers upon the courts the authority to enjoin copyright infringement,4 
while largely failing to provide direction on how that authority should 
be exercised.  More specifically, the statute’s text lacks description of 
the scope of the power to order permanent injunctions and how 
frequently it should be invoked.5  Absent further guidance from the 
statute’s legislative history,6 the only tools available to courts deciding 
 
1. THOMAS CARL SPELLING, A TREATISE ON EXTRAORDINARY RELIEF IN EQUITY 
AND AT LAW (1893) (covering injunctions in Part I).  
2. STEVEN C. YEAZELL, CIVIL PROCEDURE 282 (7th ed. 2008) (citing OWEN M. FISS, 
THE CIVIL RIGHTS INJUNCTION 91–92 (1978)).  
3. E.g., Bowen v. Massachusetts, 487 U.S. 879, 925 (1988) (Scalia, J., dissenting) 
(“[T]hough a plaintiff may often prefer a judicial order enjoining a harmful act or omission 
before it occurs, damages after the fact are considered an ‘adequate remedy’ in all but the 
most extraordinary cases.”) (citing Schoenthal v. Irving Trust Co., 287 U.S. 92, 94 (1932); 
Gaines v. Miller, 111 U.S. 395, 397–98 (1884)).  
4. 17 U.S.C. § 502(a) (2006), construed in Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, 
Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 433–34 (1984). 
5. See § 502(a).  
6. H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, at 160 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5969.  For 
example, § 502(a)’s predecessor in the 1909 Copyright Act, § 101, contains even less detail 
than its contemporary.  Section 101 only provides that infringers “shall” be subject “[t]o an 
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whether to permanently enjoin copyright infringement are § 502(a)’s 
ambiguous text7 and the history and traditions of equity.8   
The task of articulating the principles guiding judicial discretion to 
order permanent injunctions has thus fallen on the courts.  Following 
the 1976 Act’s enactment, the courts have roundly held that liability for 
infringement plus a threat of future infringement entitled copyright 
owners to permanent relief, without any burden on the copyright owner 
to demonstrate irreparable harm.9  This rule has been a boon for 
plaintiffs, with courts routinely entering permanent injunctions after 
finding defendants liable for copyright infringement.10  
The traditional rule, however, no longer enjoys nearly universal 
acceptance11 as courts begin to apply the Supreme Court’s majority 
opinion in eBay v. MercExchange.12  In that case, the Supreme Court 
unanimously held that plaintiffs in patent infringement suits “must 
satisfy a four-factor test before a court may grant” a permanent 
injunction,13 the first factor being “that [the plaintiff] has suffered an 
irreparable injury.”14  Though the lower federal courts have split on how 
this decision affects the presumption of irreparable harm in copyright 
infringement suits, their approaches have largely turned on whether to 
reject or retain the presumption in its entirety.15  As evinced by this split 
of authority, eBay has led the courts back to the ambiguity and 
inconsistencies left by § 502(a) and its legislative history, leaving 
plaintiffs and defendants in danger of potentially ad hoc decision 
making masquerading as equitable discretion.  
 
injunction restraining such infringement[.]”  Copyright Act of 1909, Pub. L. No. 60-349, § 25, 
35 Stat. 1075, 1081 (1909), amended by Copyright Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-553, § 502, 90 
Stat. 2584 (codified at 17 U.S.C. § 502 (2006)).                                                                                                                                                  
7. See discussion infra Part I.A. 
8. REGISTER OF COPYRIGHTS, REGISTER’S REPORT ON THE GENERAL REVISION OF 
THE U.S. COPYRIGHT LAW 108 (1961). 
9. Elektra Entm’t Group Inc. v. Brimley, No. CV205-134, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
56798, at *9 (S.D. Ga. 2006).  See also 4 MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER 
ON COPYRIGHT §14.06[B][1][a] (Rev. Ed. 2009). 
10. M.L.E. Music v. Kimble, Inc., 109 F. Supp. 2d 469, 472–73 (S.D.W. Va. 2000); 4 
NIMMER, supra note 9, §14.06[B][1][b][iv].  
11. For a list of circuit and district courts that have applied the traditional rule, see the 
cases cited infra at footnote 65.  
12. eBay, Inc. v. MercExchange L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388, 390–94 (2006). 
13. Id. at 391.  
14. Id. 
15. Compare Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 518 F. Supp. 2d 
1197, 1210 (C.D. Cal. 2007) (rejecting the presumption) with UMG Recordings, Inc. v. Blake, 
No. 5:06-CV-00120-BR, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 46414, at *6–7 (E.D.N.C. Jun. 26, 2007) 
(upholding the presumption while acknowledging eBay).  
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To regain the traditional rule’s clarity and predictability while 
faithfully adhering to the Supreme Court’s ruling in eBay, the courts 
should graft a rebuttable presumption of irreparable harm onto the first 
eBay factor.  Given copyright’s nature as a property-esque right to 
exclude,16 forcing a plaintiff to prove irreparable harm would carve out 
an exception to Anglo-American law’s traditional stance that 
interference with property usually calls for injunctive relief.17  Without 
an order imposing criminal sanctions, a mere damage award would 
effectively license the infringing behavior, allowing copyright 
defendants to infringe a copyright owner’s exclusive rights as long as 
those defendants are willing and able to pay the consequential and 
statutory damages.18  Such judicial licensing would shoulder owners with 
the constant burden of policing their copyrights, despite prior 
adjudication of infringement.19  Moreover, if copyright plaintiffs bear the 
burden of proof, defendants would only need to rebut the plaintiff’s case 
to prevail,20 thereby failing to address the courts’ general distrust that 
 
16. eBay, 547 U.S. at 392 (quoting Fox Film Corp. v. Doyal, 286 U.S. 123, 127 (1932)); 
Max Stul Oppenheimer, The Time and Place for “Technology-Shifting” Rights, 14 MARQ. 
INTELL. PROP. L. REV. 270, 273 (2010); Mark A. Lemley & Eugene Volokh, Freedom of 
Speech and Injunctions in Intellectual Property Cases, 48 DUKE L.J. 147, 211 (1998) 
(endorsing “the traditional view that intellectual property should be protected by means of a 
property rule (a presumptive entitlement to injunctive relief) rather than a liability rule”) 
(citing Guido Calabresi & A. Douglas Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules, and 
Inalienability: One View of the Cathedral, 85 HARV. L. REV. 1089, 1106–10 (1972)); Thomas 
W. Merrill, Property and the Right to Exclude, 77 NEB. L. REV. 730, 730 (1998) (treating the 
right to exclude as the “sine qua non” of property rights); but see 6 WILLIAM F. PATRY, 
PATRY ON COPYRIGHT § 22:1.50 (2009) (suggesting that “copyright [could be] described as a 
limited regulatory privilege created for the sole purpose of promoting the progress of science, 
and not economically benefitting copyright holders”).  
17. Lemley & Volokh, supra note 16; see 1 DAN B. DOBBS, LAW OF REMEDIES § 
2.9(3) (2nd ed. 1998) (“Injunctions are commonly sought and appropriately issued to prevent 
many kinds of threatened torts to property interests, as well as to restore property already 
tortuously harmed.”) 
18. During the oral argument for eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, LLC, 547 U.S. 388 
(2006), Justice Scalia expressed concern that issuing only monetary compensation would 
allow an infringer to “go on and skip away and continue violating” a patent.  Transcript of 
Oral Argument at 32, eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388 (2006) (No. 05-130).  
19. In Justice Story’s words, “if no other remedy could be given in cases of patents and 
copyrights than an action at law for damages, the inventor or author might be ruined by the 
necessity of perpetual litigation, without ever being able to have a final establishment of his 
rights.”  2 JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE AS 
ADMINISTERED IN ENGLAND AND THE UNITED STATES 931 (1836), quoted in 6 PATRY, 
supra note 17, § 22:2.  See also 2 JAMES L. HIGH, HIGH ON INJUNCTIONS § 988 at 746 (3rd ed. 
1890) (arguing that injunctions in copyright cases are justified by “the necessity of preventing 
. . . vexatious litigation”). 
20. In KP Permanent Make-Up, Inc. v. Lasting Impression I, Inc., 543 U.S. 111, 114 
(2004), the Supreme Court decided not to impose on a trademark infringement defendant the 
burden to prove that his or her conduct will create a likelihood of confusion.  Instead, “all the 
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defendants will follow through on their promises to stop infringing.21  In 
addition to conserving judicial resources by presuming that the facts of 
any specific case are much like other run-of-the-mill copyright suits until 
proven otherwise,22 this rule comports with the history and traditions of 
equity practice23 that eBay pushes the courts to follow.24 
This Comment will begin with Part I examining the legislative 
sources of the courts’ power to issue permanent injunctions in copyright 
cases and will lay out the traditional rule on permanent injunctions 
predating eBay.  Part II will trace eBay v. MercExchange’s progression 
through the federal courts, the rules adopted throughout the eBay 
litigation, and how the lower federal courts have split in applying the 
Supreme Court’s holding in eBay to copyright infringement suits.  
Against this background, Part III will propose that courts adopt a 
rebuttable presumption of irreparable harm to copyright cases, after 
critiquing arguments against the presumption of irreparable harm and 
explaining the traditional rule’s theoretical, prudential, and historical 
justifications.  
I.  REFINING SECTION 502(A)’S GRANT OF POWER INTO THE 
TRADITIONAL RULE 
A.  Section 502(a) Creating the Ambiguity with Permissive Plain 
Language 
According to 17 U.S.C. § 502(a), “[a]ny court having jurisdiction of a 
civil action arising under this title may, subject to the provisions of 
section 1498 of title 28, grant temporary and final injunctions on such 
terms as it may deem reasonable to prevent or restrain infringement of a 
 
defendant needs to do is to leave the factfinder unpersuaded that the plaintiff has carried its 
own burden on that point.”  Id. at 120. 
21. 6 PATRY, supra note 17, § 22:74 (citing Harolds Stores, Inc. v. Dillard Dept. Stores, 
Inc., 82 F.3d 1533, 1555–56 (10th Cir. 1996); Reader’s Digest Ass’n, Inc. v. Conservative 
Digest, Inc., 821 F.2d 800, 807 (D.C. Cir. 1987)).  Irreparable harm can also manifest in cases 
without threats of future infringement.  For example, irreparable harm may occur where the 
copyrighted works have a time-sensitive existence, MARSHALL LEAFFER, UNDERSTANDING 
COPYRIGHT LAW, at 402–03 (1999) (citing Novelty Textile Mills, Inc. v. Joanne Fabrics 
Corp., 558 F.3d 1090 (2d Cir. 1977)), or where reputational harm will result from infringing 
activity.  Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, 518 F. Supp. 2d at 1215.   
22. David McGowan, Business Law Forum: Intellectual Property Remedies: Irreparable 
Harm, 14 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 577, 582 (2010).  As one of the presumption’s opponents 
has recognized, almost every copyright case after eBay where permanent relief is sought has 
ended with a permanent injunction granted.  6 PATRY, supra note 17, § 22:74. 
23. H. Tomás Gómez-Arostegui, What History Teaches Us About Copyright 
Injunctions and the Inadequate-Remedy-at-Law Requirment, 81 S. CAL. L. REV. 1197 (2008).  
24. eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, LLC, 547 U.S. 388, 392–93 (2006).  
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copyright.”25   
The Supreme Court has treated this statute as the source of federal 
court power to issue injunctive relief.26  The courts’ power to do so is 
demonstrated, from a textual reading, by the word “may.”27  Not only 
does this word show that courts have the raw power to issue injunctions, 
but that same word also implies judicial discretion.28  Conversely, the 
statute’s text does not mandate that courts issue injunctions after finding 
infringement.  Ascribing that meaning to the statute would replace the 
first “may” with the word “shall.”29  Language placed after this first 
“may” further confirms this discretion in that the words allow courts to 
issue injunctions on terms that they “may deem reasonable.”30  
Though § 502(a) has left this discretion’s scope largely unspecified, 
the statute does outline two instances in which injunctive relief would be 
available: “to prevent or restrain infringement.”31  The word “prevent” 
by necessity is limited to future infringement: One cannot “prevent” a 
past or a present act.32  The word “restrain,” by contrast, has broader 
definitional range.  To be sure, to “restrain” someone would 
incapacitate them from performing future acts,33 but restraint also 
 
25. 17 U.S.C. § 502(a) (2006).  Summarily, the qualification described in 28 U.S.C. § 
1498(b) involves copyright infringement suits brought against the United States. H.R. REP. 
NO. 94-1476, at 160 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659, 5776.  Under that statute, 
injunctive relief may not be issued against the United States in copyright infringement cases 
brought in the Court of Federal Claims.  Id.  
26. Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 433–34 (1984) 
(“The Copyright Act provides the owner of a copyright with a potent arsenal of remedies 
against an infringer of his work, including an injunction to restrain the infringer from 
violating his rights”).  See also Superhype Publ’g, Inc. v. Vasiliou, 838 F. Supp. 1220, 1126 
(S.D. Ohio 1993) (“The Copyright Act grants the Court broad powers to enjoin 
infringement.”).  
27. § 502(a).  
28. YULE KIM, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., 97-589, STATUTORY INTERPRETATION: 
GENERAL PRINCIPLES AND RECENT TRENDS 9 (2008) (quoting Rastelli v. Warden, Metro. 
Corr. Ctr., 782 F.2d 17, 23 (2d Cir. 1986) (“The use of a permissive verb—’may review’ 
instead of ‘shall review’—suggests a discretionary rather than mandatory review process.”)).  
29. Id. (quoting Lexecon, Inc. v. Milberg Weiss Bershad Hynes & Lerach, 523 U.S. 26, 
35 (1998) (“The mandatory ‘shall’ . . . normally creates an obligation impervious to judicial 
discretion.”)).  
30. § 502(a). 
31. Id.  
32. See AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY 1391 (4th ed. 2000) (providing such 
modern definitions to “prevent” as “[t]o keep from happening,” “[t]o keep (someone) from 
doing something; impede,” and a another definition that has fallen into disuse: “To come 
before; precede”).  This word’s etymological roots further point to the word’s orientation 
towards the future, with the Middle English word “preventen” meaning “to anticipate” and 
the Latin word “praevenire” meaning “to come.”  Id.  
33. In fact, two dictionaries include the word “prevent” in their definitions for 
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results in a present inhibition—an inability to do something 
contemporaneous to the initial restraint itself.34  In any event, one 
cannot restrain in the present a completed past act.  Therefore, § 
502(a)’s text appears to exclude past infringement with no threat of 
recurrence from this judicial remedial power’s coverage.35  Beyond this 
language, however, the statute does not define the courts’ authority to 
order permanent relief any further.36 
B.  Legislative History Deepening the Ambiguity with Conflicts between 
Entitlement and Discretion 
1.  Suggesting Discretion by Rebutting Section 101’s Entitlement 
Language with Court Practice 
Where § 502(a)’s text leaves off, the 1976 Copyright Act’s legislative 
history does more to cloud than to clarify how readily attainable 
injunctive relief ought to be.  For example, § 101 of the Copyright Act of 
1909 states that “[i]f any person shall infringe the copyright in any work 
protected under the copyright laws of the United States such person 
shall be liable . . . [t]o an injunction restraining such infringement.”37  
This statute creates confusion with its use of the word “shall.”  As noted 
above, the word “shall” typically signifies a legislative mandate; that is, 
the subject of the sentence containing “shall” must perform the action 
described by whatever that word precedes.38  On this reading, a court 
would theoretically be bound by the 1909 Act to order permanent 
 
“restrain.” WEBSTER’S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 1936 (2002); AMERICAN 
HERITAGE DICTIONARY 1487 (4th ed. 2000).  
34. See WEBSTER’S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 1936 (2002) 
(providing the following definitions for “restrain”: “to hold (as a person) back from some 
action, procedure, or course . . . prevent from doing something (as by physical or moral force 
or social pressure) . . . to limit or restrict to or in respect to a particular action or course . . . 
keep within bounds or under control . . . to moderate or limit the force, effect, development, 
or full exercise of . . . prevent or rule out excesses or extremes of . . . to keep from being 
manifested or performed”); AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY 1487 (4th ed. 2000) 
(providing other definitions for “restrain”:  “To hold back or keep in check; control . . . To 
hold (a person) back; prevent . . . To deprive freedom or liberty . . . To limit or restrict”).  
35. Explaining the scope of the power to issue injunctive relief under the 1909 Act, the 
Register’s Report took this same position.  REGISTER OF COPYRIGHTS, REGISTER’S REPORT 
ON THE GENERAL REVISION OF THE U.S. COPYRIGHT LAW 108 (1961).  For a more in-depth 
treatment of the Register’s Report, see Part I.B.2 infra. 
36. See id. 
37. Copyright Act of 1909, Pub. L. No. 60-349, § 25, 35 Stat. 1075, 1081 (1909), 
amended by Copyright Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-553, § 502, 90 Stat. 2584 (codified at 17 
U.S.C. § 502 (2006)).  
38. YULE KIM, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., 97-589, STATUTORY INTERPRETATION: 
GENERAL PRINCIPLES AND RECENT TRENDS 9 (2008).  
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injunctions in every case where liability for infringement attaches.   
Such a reading, though consistent with general canons of statutory 
construction,39 does not comport with how the courts treated injunctions 
under the 1909 Act.  A number of courts denied injunctive relief in the 
years the 1909 Act was effective, such as in cases where no threat of 
future infringement presented itself.   
For example, in Phillips v. Constitution Publishing Co., a poet sued a 
newspaper publishing company for reprinting one of his poems in an 
issue of the Atlanta Constitution.40  During the case, the company 
claimed that it had no intent to infringe the poet’s copyrights again.41  
The district court found this intention dispositive in denying injunctive 
relief.42   
Another circuit court opinion directly addressed the argument that § 
101 of the 1909 Act requires injunctive relief, and the court expressly 
ruled to the contrary.43  In Shapiro, Bernstein & Co. v. 4636 S. Vermont 
Ave., a music publisher sued a music store for selling a collection of 
songs owned by the publisher.44  As to whether injunctive relief should 
issue, the plaintiff argued that “under § 101(a) the district court was 
required to grant a permanent injunction after he found appellee’s sale 
infringed, despite his finding that there was no likelihood that appellee 
would again infringe.”45  Though the court recognized that future 
infringement need not be certain or even probable to occur to warrant a 
permanent injunction, § 101 does not require a court to issue such 
relief.46  As such, the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s order 
refusing to enjoin the defendant from further infringement.47  
Therefore, § 101 of the 1909 Act, though perhaps phrased in terms 
of entitlement to injunctive relief, simply allows courts to issue 
 
39. See id.  
40. Phillips v. Const. Publ’g Co., 72 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 69, 69–70 (N.D. Ga. 1947).  
41. Id. at 70.  
42. Id. This case may have been decided differently today, considering the distrust the 
courts have expressed regarding defendants’ assertions that they will not infringe copyrights 
again.  See discussion infra Part III.B. 
43. Shapiro, Bernstein & Co. v 4636 S. Vermont Ave., Inc., 367 F.2d 236 (9th Cir. 
1966).  
44. Id. at 238.  
45. Id. at 242. 
46. Id. The case cites an edition of the Nimmer treatise, which states that “injunctive 
relief ordinarily will not be granted when there is no probability or threat of continuing or 
additional infringements.”  Id.  The opinion further notes that “Nimmer cites Sheldon v. 
Moredall Realty Corp., 95 F.2d 48 (2d Cir. 1938), and Wihtol v. Crow, 309 F.2d 777 (8th Cir. 
1962), both of which support his statement.” Shapiro, 367 F.2d at 242. 
47. Id.  
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permanent injunctions without forcing them to order that relief in every 
case.  In any event, the courts appear to have acted as if the word 
“shall” in § 101 in reality meant “may.” 
2.  Pointing Toward Discretion in the Register’s Report 
In its report recommending changes to the then-current federal 
copyright laws,48 the Register of Copyrights indicated that judicial 
discretion rests at the heart of the power to issue injunctions granted by 
§ 101.  To be sure, the Register’s Report makes the existence of this 
discretion explicit, describing courts’ decisions whether “to issue or deny 
an injunction” as “the exercise of their discretion.”49   
Further rebutting the argument that injunctions must issue in every 
case where infringement liability attaches, the report lists examples of 
cases where injunctive relief would not be appropriately entered, such 
as “where the only injury contemplated has already occurred”50 and 
where “an injunction may be too harsh on the defendant.”51 
Conversely, the report states that an injunction is “the most effective 
remedy” in cases where it would “prevent[] future injury to the 
plaintiff.”52  In sifting through cases between those with threats of future 
infringement and those where no such threat exists, as well as 
considering other matters relevant to whether an injunction should issue 
such as “balanc[ing] the plaintiff’s need against the consequences the 
defendant would suffer,”53 the report suggests that “[t]he general 
principles of equity followed by the courts in granting and denying 
injunctions are applicable to copyright infringement suits.”54   
3. Almost Confirming Discretion but Also Noting Entitlement in House 
Report 1476 
House Report 1476, in treating § 502(a) of the Copyright Act of 
1976, generally confirms that this discretionary power rests with the 
courts.55  Nothing in that section of the report even attempts to 
 
48. Emanuel Cellar, Foreword to REGISTER OF COPYRIGHTS, REGISTER’S REPORT 
ON THE GENERAL REVISION OF THE U.S. COPYRIGHT LAW iii, iii (1961).   
49. REGISTER OF COPYRIGHTS, REGISTER’S REPORT ON THE GENERAL REVISION 






55. H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, at 160 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5969, 5776 
(“Section 502(a) reasserts the discretionary power of courts to grant injunctions and 
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demarcate the boundaries of a judge’s discretion in this context, 
whether in terms of scope or substance.56  
To further complicate matters, House Report 1476 in another 
section appears at first blush to replace discretion with a categorical rule 
mandating injunctive relief in all cases.  While explaining 17 U.S.C. § 
412, the report states that “[u]nder the general scheme of the bill, a 
copyright owner whose work has been infringed before registration 
would be entitled to the remedies ordinarily available in infringement 
cases [including] an injunction on terms the court considers fair.”57  
Speaking of being “entitled” to certain remedies may facially suggest 
congressional intent to abrogate judicial discretion and, in its place, to 
order the courts to issue injunctions upon finding infringement as a 
matter of right.58  
 That said, read against House Report 1476’s entirety, that 
interpretation is not required.  That passage treated a section of the 
Copyright Act limiting the remedies available for unregistered works.59  
The quoted material above, then, only refers to remedies unaffected by 
the limitations imposed by § 412, and, as such, does not alter the scope 
of the availability of permanent injunctions.  House Report 1476 merely 
mentions these remedies to define the limitations on the availability of 
other forms of relief, namely statutory damages and attorney’s fees.60  
 More fundamentally, the report’s use of the word “entitled” could 
just as easily have acted as shorthand for a particular result—obtaining 
injunctive relief—once a plaintiff demonstrates that certain equitable 
factors counsel for permanently enjoining infringement.  Put another 
way, court will deem injunctive relief appropriate in some cases, and in 
those cases, plaintiffs then become “entitled” to relief when the equities 
bear in their favor, though the decision to issue injunctive relief remains 
ultimately a matter of judicial discretion. 
House Report 1476’s wording creates interpretative possibilities that 
are many and varied, rebuking any attempt to harmonize its conflicting 
language on discretion and entitlement coherently from the text alone.  
This lack of clarity produces further ambiguity in the legislative sources 
 
restraining orders, whether ‘preliminary,’ ‘temporary,’ ‘interlocutory,’ ‘permanent,’ or ‘final,’ 
to prevent or stop infringements of copyright.”).  
56. See id.  
57. Id. at 158.  
58. At least one court defined the word “entitled” as meaning that courts must in all 
cases issue injunctive relief after a finding of liability.  Christopher Phelps & Assocs., LLC v. 
Galloway, 492 F.3d 532, 543 (4th Cir. 2007). 
59. 17 U.S.C. § 412 (2006).  
60. See H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, at 158.  
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and thus confuses the equitable analysis courts must undertake when 
deciding motions for permanent injunctions.61  
C.  Caselaw Replacing the Legislative Ambiguity with the Traditional 
Rule 
The ambiguities left by § 502(a)’s sparse language and the 
inconsistencies within § 502(a)’s legislative history encapsulate the 
theoretical tension in how easily a copyright plaintiff may obtain 
injunctive relief.  With so little direction given by Congress as to when 
injunctions are appropriately entered, save for the aim to prevent 
infringement and the amorphous concept of discretion, the courts have 
stepped in to give this grant of authority some perceptible shape.62   
The predominant rule that filled in § 502(a)’s gaps tries to obtain the 
best of both discretion and entitlement.  Under this rule, irreparable 
harm is presumed,63 and “a past infringement and a substantial 
likelihood of future infringements [will] normally entitle the copyright 
holder to a permanent injunction against the infringer.”64   
This rule has been almost universally applied.65  Arguments 
 
61. There is likewise absolutely no treatment of the presumption of irreparable harm in 
copyright infringement suits. 
62. Some preliminary injunction cases decided before the Copyright Act of 1976, 
including § 502(a), became law required plaintiffs to show some irreparable harm, though 
that showing need only have been a “threshold” one.  4 NIMMER, supra note 9, 
§14.06[A][2][b], n.49 (citing American Fabrics Co. v. Lace Art, Inc., 291 F. Supp. 589 
(S.D.N.Y. 1968)).  At least one case decided under the 1976 Act overlaid the elements of 
preliminary injunctive relief onto those for permanent injunctions.  Sony Music Entm’t, Inc. 
v. Global Arts Prods., 45 F. Supp. 2d 1345, 1347 (S.D. Fla. 1999) (“The only difference in the 
elements needed for the granting of a permanent, as opposed to a preliminary, injunction is 
the need to show success on the merits, not merely likelihood of success.”).  Thus, the rules 
operating when a plaintiff seeks a preliminary injunction may inform whether to grant a 
permanent injunction.  Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 518 F. Supp. 2d 
1197, 1212–14 (C.D. Cal. 2007).  There are, however, concerns that arise with regard to 
preliminary relief that do not present themselves when permanent injunctions are granted, 
such as whether preliminary relief in copyright cases effectuates a prior restraint on speech 
unconstitutional under the First Amendment.  Lemley & Volokh, supra note 16, at 149–51.  
Thus, preliminary relief analyses cannot serve as a complete proxy for determining whether 
permanent relief is proper.  
63. Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp. v. Streeter, 438 F. Supp. 2d 1065, 1072–73 (D. 
Ariz. 2006); Elektra Entm’t Group, Inc. v. Bryant, 2004 WL 783123, at *4 (C.D. Cal. 2004); 
Sony Music Entm’t Inc. v. Global Arts Prods., 45 F. Supp. 2d 1345, 1347 (S.D. Fla. 1999)); 6 
PATRY, supra note 17, § 22:74 (citing Micro Star v. Formgen Inc., 154 F.3d 1107, 1109 (9th 
Cir. 1998)); 2 DAN B. DOBBS, LAW OF REMEDIES § 6.3(5) (2d ed. 1998). 
64. Pac. & S. Co. v. Duncan, 744 F.2d 1490, 1499 (11th Cir. 1984).  
65. Bridgeport Music, Inc. v. Justin Combs Publ’g, 507 F.3d 470, 492 (6th Cir. 2007); 
BMG Music v. Gonzalez, 430 F.3d 888, 893 (7th Cir. 2005); Nat’l Football League v. McBee 
& Bruno’s, Inc., 792 F.2d 726, 732 (8th Cir. 1986); MAI Sys. Corp. v. Peak Computer, 991 
F.2d 511, 520 (9th Cir. 1993); Harold Stores, Inc. v. Dillard Dep’t Stores, Inc., 82 F.3d 1533 
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supporting a threat of future infringement that have proven successful 
have included the defendant’s ongoing infringing activity,66 related 
litigation between the parties,67 and failing to defend the infringement 
lawsuit under which an injunction would arise.68  Even absent these 
specific reasons, the courts applying this rule have not been hesitant to 
order permanent relief; to be sure, permanent injunctions have become 
common and routine in copyright infringement suits.69 
The ready, even eager, disposition to grant permanent injunctions in 
copyright cases is illustrated by the D.C. Circuit’s decision in Reader’s 
Digest v. Conservative Digest.70  In that case, Reader’s Digest sued the 
Conservative Digest for infringing its trade dress and copyright in the 
design of Conservative Digest’s cover.71  After holding Conservative 
Digest liable for both trade dress and copyright infringement,72 the 
district court enjoined Conservative Digest from using the two covers 
that were the subject of the suit.73   
The D.C. Circuit upheld this injunction, despite also noting that 
Conservative Digest had halted its infringing activities.74  Recall that 
past infringement alone presented one instance that, according to some 
commentators, especially counseled against a permanent injunction.75  
 
(10th Cir. 1996); Walt Disney Co. v. Powell, 897 F.2d 565, 567 (D.C. Cir. 1990); Ford Motor 
Co. v. B & H Supply, Inc., 646 F. Supp. 975 (D. Minn. 1986); Encyclopaedia Britannica Educ. 
Corp. v. Crooks, 542 F. Supp. 1156, 1187 (W.D.N.Y. 1982); Tempo Music, Inc. v. Christenson 
Food & Mercantile Co., 806 F. Supp. 816, 821 (D. Minn. 1992); Sailor Music v. IML Corp., 
867 F. Supp. 565, 569 (E.D. Mich. 1994); Frank Music Corp. v. Sugg, 393 F. Supp. 2d 1145 
(W.D. Okla. 2005). 
66. Capitol Records v. Carmichael, 508 F. Supp. 2d 1079 (S.D. Ala. 2007); 
Encyclopaedia Britannica Educ. Corp., 542 F. Supp. 1156.  
67. Microsoft Corp. v. Big Boy Distrib. LLC, 589 F. Supp. 2d 1308, 1321 (S.D. Fla. 
2008).  
68. Broad. Music, Inc. v Spring Mt. Area Bavarian Resort, Ltd., 555 F. Supp. 2d 537 
(E.D. Pa. 2008); Capital Records, 508 F. Supp. 2d 1079; Elektra Entm’t Group, Inc. v. 
Crawford, 226 F.R.D. 388 (C.D. Cal. 2005).  
69. Microsoft Corp. v. Maryland Micro.com, Inc., No. JFM- 01-3797, 2003 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 13735, at *19 (D. Md. 2003) (“Prevailing plaintiffs in copyright and trademark 
infringement cases are normally entitled to injunctive relief.”); M.L.E. Music v. Kimble, Inc., 
109 F. Supp. 2d 469, 472–73 (S.D.W. Va. 2000) (“Various district courts within this circuit 
have held that when a claim of copyright infringement has been proven, a permanent 
injunction prohibiting further infringements is appropriate and routinely entered.”); 4 
NIMMER, supra note 9, §14.06[B][1][b][iv]. 
70. Reader’s Digest Ass’n, Inc. v. Conservative Digest, Inc., 821 F.2d 800 (D.C. Cir. 
1987), abrogated on other grounds by Fogerty v. Fantasy, Inc., 510 U.S. 517 (1994). 
71. Id. at 802–03.  
72. Id. at 805–06. 
73. Id. at 807. 
74. Id.   
75. REGISTER OF COPYRIGHTS, REGISTER’S REPORT ON THE GENERAL REVISION 
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Furthermore, the D.C. Circuit quoted and cited a rule that “[w]hen a 
defendant has ceased its infringing conduct and shows no inclination to 
repeat the offense, a court may not issue an injunction” covering more 
than Conservative’s Digest’s two covers.76  Nevertheless, the D.C. 
Circuit still found an injunction appropriate to protect the two covers 
that already were infringed.77   
Some opinions go a step further: they perfunctorily state the 
traditional rule while skirting any detailed treatment of how the rule 
bears on each case’s facts.78  For example, in Pacific & Southern Co. v. 
Duncan, the district and circuit courts stated that a version of the rule 
noted above applied and then shifted their analysis from that rule to 
other ancillary reasons to deny permanent relief.  In the copyright 
infringement suit in Duncan, the owner of WXIA, a television station, 
sued Duncan for videotaping and selling television programs without 
the television stations’ permission.79   
After the district court determined that the defendant infringed the 
plaintiff’s news programs,80 the district court denied the plaintiff’s 
request for a permanent injunction.81  Though the district court 
recognized the general rule that “a plaintiff is entitled to a permanent 
injunction when copyright liability has been established and there is a 
threat of continuing infringement,”82 the district court rested its decision 
on an exception to this rule: “the Court may omit injunctive relief where 
it would disserve the public interest.”83  As summarized by the Eleventh 
Circuit, the district court ultimately denied a permanent injunction for 
three reasons:  
First, the sales did not seriously threaten WXIA’s creativity, so an 
injunction would not significantly further the main objective of the 
 
OF THE U.S. COPYRIGHT LAW 108 (1961) (“[A]n injunction may be futile, as where the only 
injury contemplated has already occurred.”); 4 NIMMER, supra note 7, § 14.06[B][1][a] 
(“[I]njunctive relief ordinarily is not granted absent any threat of continuing or additional 
infringements.”). 
76. Reader’s Digest, 821 F.2d at 807 (citing Schutt Mfg. Co. v. Riddell, Inc., 673 F.2d 
202, 207 (7th Cir. 1982); Robert Stigwood Group, Ltd. v. Hurwitz, 462 F.2d 910, 913 (2d Cir. 
1972)).  
77. Id. at 807. 
78. E.g. Pac. & S. Co. v. Duncan, 744 F.2d 1490, 1499–1500 (11th Cir. 1984); Orth-O-
Vision, Inc. v. Home Box Office, 474 F. Supp. 672, 686 (S.D.N.Y. 1979).  
79. Pac. & S. Co., 744 F.2d at 1493 
80. Pac. & S. Co. v. Duncan, 572 F. Supp. 1186, 1195 (N.D. Ga. 1983).  
81. Id. at 1196–97.  
82. Id. at 1196 (citing Universal City Studios v. Sony Corp. of Am., 659 F.2d 963, 976 
(9th Cir. 1981), rev’d, 464 U.S. 417 (1984)).  
83. Id.  
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copyright laws, fostering creativity.  Second, the court feared that an 
injunction would threaten First Amendment values served by the 
increased public availability of the news made possible by TV News 
Clips.  Finally, the court found that WXIA had abandoned its copyright 
on several portions of the newscasts; it declined to formulate a decree 
that would distinguish between the abandoned and unabandoned 
portions.84 
While the Eleventh Circuit agreed with the district court on the 
liability question,85 that court rejected all three of the district court’s 
grounds for denying an injunction.”86  
Regarding the first factor outlined by the district court, the Eleventh 
Circuit argued that though the defendant’s infringing activity would 
only have minute effects on the plaintiff’s creativity, “[t]he disincentive 
to creativity caused by the infringement would be just as small if WXIA 
were to wait and bring infringement actions in the future.”87  Given that 
damage awards in subsequent copyright lawsuits and injunctive relief 
would have materially the same effect on the plaintiff’s creativity, the 
first factor could not be dispositive.88  That the plaintiff could bring 
subsequent suits for damages also defeated the district court’s second 
factor: the free speech consideration.  Though the Eleventh Circuit 
recognized that “[i]t is undoubtedly true that TV News Clips (like any 
copyright infringer) increases public access to the copyrighted work[,] 
the First Amendment issue of public access was duly considered when 
resolving the liability issue.”89  As to the third factor, the Eleventh 
Circuit, though deferring to the district court on the abandonment 
question,90 held that the district court could have and should have issued 
an injunction covering the unerased material.91  As such, the Eleventh 
Circuit reversed this portion of the district court’s judgment and 
remanded.92   
The Eleventh Circuit only mentioned the traditional rule on the 
threat of future infringement in passing,93 noting that the plaintiff would 
 
84. Pac. & S. Co., 744 F.2d at 1494.  
85. Id. at 1499.  
86. Id.  
87. Id.  
88. Id. 
89. Id. at 1499–1500.  
90. Id. at 1500.  
91. Id.  
92. Id.  
93. See id. 
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be burdened with a multitude of copyright suits.94  The court did believe 
that such enforcement problems presented “a classic case, then, of a 
past infringement and a substantial likelihood of future infringements.”95  
But nothing in its presentation of the facts suggested a tangible threat 
that the plaintiff’s copyrights would be infringed after this specific 
lawsuit concluded.  Therefore, the traditional rule in this case posed 
little if any serious obstacles to the plaintiff’s request for permanent 
injunctions.  
Even with varying degrees of how leniently the courts would apply 
the traditional rule, the rule’s unanimous adoption provided a sense of 
clarity and predictability: plaintiffs that filed lawsuits for copyright 
infringement could very well expect that one of the remedies they will 
receive upon a finding of liability would be a permanent injunction.  
Likewise, those defendants that chose to answer and oppose these 
lawsuits would likely be cognizant of the rule and its typically liberal 
application, all factors that would figure into whether and how a 
settlement could be reached and drafted.   
Whatever the rule’s faults, the ambiguity left by § 502(a) and its 
predecessors was not among them.  
II.  REINTRODUCING AMBIGUITY FASHIONED AS DISCRETION: EBAY 
V. MERCEXCHANGE AND SUBSEQUENT DECISIONS 
The aforementioned rules on presuming irreparable harm and 
granting permanent injunctions when future infringement is a possibility 
may have run their course in some of the lower federal courts after the 
Supreme Court’s decision in eBay v. MercExchange.96  That said, as this 
Part demonstrates, not every case coming down after eBay treats that 
decision as abrogating the traditional rule treated above in Part I.97  
A.  eBay v. MercExchange’s Series of Multi-Factor Tests 
1.  The Battle of Presumptions on the Path to the Supreme Court 
In eBay, MercExchange sued eBay and Half.com for their alleged 
infringing use of a patented method.98  MercExchange’s patents refer to 
“a network of consignment nodes and a low cost easy to use posting 
 
94. Id. 
95. Id. at 1499.  
96. eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388 (2006).  
97. See discussion supra Part I.C.  
98. MercExchange, L.L.C. v. eBay Inc., 401 F.3d 1323, 1325 (Fed. Cir. 2005).  
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terminal for the virtual presentment of goods to market.”99  As the 
patents explain, “[a] consignment node is a computer database of used 
goods preferably operated by a used good, collectable shop keeper or a 
bailee.”100   
These patents disclose two ways how the invention can be practiced.  
First, the invention “may be an electronic market maker for collectable 
and used goods, a means for electronic presentment of goods for sale, 
and an electronic agent to search the network for hard to find goods.”101  
Second, the invention may take the form of “a low cost posting terminal 
[that] allows the virtual presentment of goods to market and establishes 
a two tiered market of retail and wholesale sales.”102 
MercExchange, however did not practice these patents.103  As the 
U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia noted, 
MercExchange “merely exists to license its patented technology to 
others.”104  In fact, MercExchange at one time “sought to license its 
patent to eBay and Half.com.”105  MercExchange and eBay and 
Half.com could not reach an agreement,106 but the latter two companies 
nonetheless decided to use MercExchange’s patented technology.  
In response, “MercExchange . . . filed a patent infringement suit 
against eBay and Half.com,”107 and ultimately, the jury found eBay and 
Half.com liable.108  In addition to a damage judgment for $35 million, 
MercExchange filed a motion to enjoin the defendants from infringing 
these patents again.109  Before proceeding to whether an injunction 
should properly issue in that case, the district court stated, consistent 
with the practice in copyright cases, “the grant of injunctive relief is 
 
99. U.S. Patent No. 6,202,051 (filed Feb. 19, 1999); U.S. Patent No. 6,085,176 (filed 
Mar. 8, 1999); U.S. Patent No. 5,845,265 (filed Nov. 7, 1995). 
100. U.S. Patent No. 6,202,051 (filed Feb. 19, 1999); U.S. Patent No. 6,085,176 (filed 
Mar. 8, 1999); U.S. Patent No. 5,845,265 (filed Nov. 7, 1995). 
101. U.S. Patent No. 6,202,051 (filed Feb. 19, 1999); U.S. Patent No. 6,085,176 (filed 
Mar. 8, 1999); U.S. Patent No. 5,845,265 (filed Nov. 7, 1995). 
102. U.S. Patent No. 6,202,051 (filed Feb. 19, 1999); U.S. Patent No. 6,085,176 (filed 
Mar. 8, 1999); U.S. Patent No. 5,845,265 (filed Nov. 7, 1995). 
103. Names for such companies include “non-practicing entities,” “patent enforcement 
and holding companies,” and, the more pejorative term, “patent trolls.”  Jason Rantanen, 
Slaying the Patent Troll: Litigation as an Effective Strategy Against Patent Threats, 23 SANTA 
CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 159, 165 (2006).   
104. MercExchange, L.L.C. v. eBay Inc., 275 F. Supp. 2d 695, 712 (E.D. Va. 2003).  
105. eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388, 390 (2006). 
106. Id.  For a more detailed treatment of the facts, see MercExchange, L.L.C. v. eBay, 
Inc., No. 2:01cv736 (E.D. Va. Oct 18, 2002) (Markman order).  
107. Id. 
108. MercExchange, L.L.C. v. eBay Inc., 275 F. Supp. 2d 695, 698 (E.D. Va. 2003).  
109. Id. at 710–11.  
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considered the norm.”110  Though judges retain the final say in whether 
an injunction will issue, the district court noted that a presumption of 
irreparable harm attaches with a finding of infringement.111  This 
presumption, according to the district court, “can be rebutted by factors 
such as whether the infringer has ceased infringing activity, whether the 
patentee has granted licenses in the past such that it can be 
compensated for the infringement, and whether the patentee delayed in 
bringing the lawsuit.”112   
On the merits of MercExchange’s motion for a permanent 
injunction, the district court reproduced MercExchange’s arguments 
that irreparable harm would result, namely that the company fashioned 
its patents as property, that the company could not develop its 
inventions, and that it could not retain “the exclusive right to license its 
patented technology.”113  The district court rejected these arguments, 
countering that   
the evidence of the plaintiff’s willingness to license its 
patents, its lack of commercial activity in practicing the 
patents, and its comments to the media as to its intent 
with respect to enforcement of its patent rights, are 
sufficient to rebut the presumption that it will suffer 
irreparable harm if an injunction does not issue.114 
The district court thus held that no irreparable harm would fall on 
the defendant115 and denied MercExchange’s request for a permanent 
injunction.116  
The Federal Circuit reversed the district court’s judgment.117  After 
reaffirming “the general rule . . . that a permanent injunction will issue 
once infringement and validity have been adjudged,”118 the Federal 
Circuit further elaborated that the exercise of discretion to deny 
 
110. Id. (citing W.L. Gore & Assocs., Inc. v. Garlock, Inc., 842 F.2d 1275, 1281 (Fed. 
Cir. 1988); Odetics, Inc. v. Storage Tech. Corp., 14 F. Supp. 2d 785, 788 (E.D.Va.1998), aff’d, 
185 F.3d 1259 (Fed. Cir.1999)).  Much like 17 U.S.C. § 502(a), the statute authorizing federal 
courts to issue injunctions in patent cases provides that judges “may grant injunctions in 
accordance with the principles of equity to prevent the violation of any right secured by 
patent, on such terms as the court deems reasonable.”  35 U.S.C. § 283 (2006).  
111. MercExchange, 275 F. Supp. 2d at 711. 
112. Id. at 712. 
113. Id. at 711.  
114. Id. at 712. 
115. Id.  
116. Id. at 715. 
117. MercExchange, L.L.C. v. eBay, Inc., 401 F.3d 1323, 1339 (Fed. Cir. 2005). 
118. Id. at 1338.  
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injunctive relief is a rare and exceptional occurrence.119  To be sure, the 
Federal Circuit stated that injunctions will only be denied when the 
public interest counsels against such orders.120  With this rule in tow, the 
Federal Circuit proceeded to disagree with each argument the district 
court utilized.121   
Though the Federal Circuit’s opinion did not specifically refer to the 
irreparable harm factor, it did in two paragraphs treat the problem of 
continuing infringement and MercExchange’s status as a non-practicing 
entity respectively.   
As to continuing infringement, though the district court expressed 
concern over the possibility that the defendants may design their 
websites around the injunction with nearly de minimis modifications to 
avoid the claims in MercExchange’s patents and that constantly 
litigating these rights would drain judicial resources,122 the Federal 
Circuit understood this threat as “not a sufficient basis for denying a 
permanent injunction.”123  To be sure, subsequent litigation on 
continuing infringement would take the form of entire cases retrying 
infringement or more contained contempt hearings.124  Neither the 
district court nor the Federal Circuit addressed how injunctive relief 
furnishes a potent remedy for addressing this problem.   
As to MercExchange’s licensing behavior, the Federal Circuit 
provided two views on whether a non-practicing entity should receive a 
permanent injunction.  First, the Federal Circuit reaffirmed that “a 
court may decline to enter an injunction when ‘a patentee’s failure to 
practice the patented invention frustrates an important public need.’”125  
This rule, when read against the paragraph treating non-practicing 
entities on the next page, does not mean that non-practicing entities 
may never receive injunctive relief.  To the contrary, as the Federal 
Circuit held, “[t]he statutory right to exclude is equally available to both 
groups, and the right to an adequate remedy to enforce that right should 
be equally available to both as well.”126  
 
119. Id.  
120. Id.  
121. Id. at 1339.  
122. MercExchange, 275 F. Supp. 2d at 714. 
123. MercExchange, 401 F.3d at 1339. 
124. Id.  
125. Id. at 1338 (citing Rite-Hite Corp. v. Kelley, Inc., 56 F.3d 1538, 1547 (Fed. Cir. 
1997)).  
126. Id. at 1339. 
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2.  The Supreme Court’s Oral Musings on Irreparable Harm 
The Supreme Court subsequently granted certiorari to determine 
“[w]hether the Federal Circuit erred in setting forth a general rule in 
patent cases that a district court must, absent exceptional circumstances, 
issue a permanent injunction after a finding of infringement.”127  
At oral argument, the presumption of irreparable harm did make 
several appearances.  Cropping up in the opening moments, Justice 
Scalia pushed back from the petitioners’ argument that the 
Congressional grant of authority in 35 U.S.C. § 283 rejects a categorical 
rule in favor of injunctive relief in patent cases.  Justice Scalia countered 
that irreparable harm will usually result from the deprivation of a 
property right.128  In response to Justice Scalia’s question, Justice Breyer 
conceived a possible example where an injunction might not issue.  
Partially echoing the eBay’s facts, “a person who uses his property not 
at all himself, but licensed the public generally.”129   
That being said, Justice Breyer later admitted that he does not 
“know how courts do normally act in other areas of property law.”130  
Chief Justice Roberts then returned to Justice Scalia’s statement: “[T]he 
exercise of discretion is channeled over time, as—as judges apply it in—
in similar cases.  You’re not suggesting that in a typical run-of-the-mill 
patent case, no special considerations, would it be wrong to say that in 
those cases you typically would grant an injunction?”131  In the face of 
these questions, the petitioners stuck to their principal point that judges 
should be allowed to exercise discretion to grant or deny injunctive 
relief, rather than be bound by a conclusivepresumption.132   
The United States’ argued as amicus in support of the petitioners,133 
but the United States conceded that irreparable harm will “normally” 
 
127. Petition for Writ of Certiorari at i, eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 
388 (2006) (No. 05-130), 2005 WL 1801263. The Supreme Court adopted this as the main 
issue for decision in its order granting certiorari. eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 546 U.S. 
1029 (2005).  Though the Supreme Court asked the parties to brief about the Continental 
Paper Bag case, discussed infra note 188, the Court cited the case with approval, and thus, 
that case presumptively remains good law.  eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388, 
393 (2006).  
128. Transcript of Oral Argument at 6–7, eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 
388 (2006) (No. 05-130) (“It seems to me very rare where—where someone takes your 
property, that the court wouldn’t—wouldn’t give you the property back.”).  
129. Id. at 7.  
130. Id. at 8. 
131. Id. at 9.  
132. Id. passim.  
133. Transcript of Oral Argument at 27, eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 
388 (2006) (No. 05-130).   
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result from patent infringement.134  Justice Scalia reappeared, pointing to 
the threat of future violations.135  Should a district court refuse to issue 
an injunction and issue damages for future violations, in Justice Scalia’s 
view, the district court would effectively tell the patentee, “Here, take 
your money,”136 and the infringer, “[Y]ou, God bless you, go continue to 
violate the patent.”137  The United States then backed off, stating instead 
that a district judge should then have the discretion to structure the 
injunction around the possibility that eBay or another infringer would 
design around the patent at issue, without directly addressing Justice 
Scalia’s question aside from the summary response of “[a]bsolutely 
not.”138 
The only portion of MercExchange’s argument that speaks to the 
general rule adopted by the Federal Circuit arose in the very beginning.  
There, MercExchange opened its argument with Justice Story’s 
commentaries on equity, noting that “a final judgment of patent 
infringement yields an injunction in all but the very rare case.”139  This 
position, according to MercExchange, presents an “application” of 
“traditional equitable principles.”140  After these opening remarks, the 
only other reference to the four-factor test arose when Justice Breyer 
revisited MercExchange’s licensing practice.  In particular, Justice 
Breyer argued that damage could be easily calculable in some 
circumstances, such as where a patentee “licenses only to people who, 
by and large, will not take that product and develop it further.”141  
Beyond that line of questioning, the Supreme Court notably did not 
closely examine or scrutinize MercExchange’s introductory position.  
3.  The Supreme Court’s Decision in Favor of Discretion and Tradition  
Ultimately, the Supreme Court rejected the use of the “categorical 
rules” utilized by the Eastern District of Virginia and the Federal 
Circuit.142  As to the district court’s supposed rule that injunctions are 
improvidently granted to patentees that only contract out their patents 
to others without practicing them, the Supreme Court hypothesized an 
instance in which a non-practicing individual would prudently receive 
 
134. Id. at 31 
135. Id. at 32. 
136. Id. at 33.  
137. Id. 
138. Id. at 33–34.  
139. Id. at 37.  Those commentaries are discussed infra in Part III.A.  
140. Id. 
141. Id. at 41.  
142. eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388, 393 (2006). 
2011] THE CONTINUING VITALITY 277 
 
injunctive relief: an inventor preferring to license the patented invention 
to others with the financial wherewithal to reduce the invention to 
practice.143  With this example potentially warranting a permanent 
injunction should infringement occur, the district court’s rule to the 
contrary did not pass muster.144  
The Federal Circuit’s rule, though explicitly including exceptions 
where courts should act apart from the rule,145 was fashioned by the 
Supreme Court as a “categorical rule” contravening the traditional 
equitable discretion trial judges are charged with exercising in granting 
or denying permanent injunctions. 146  In particular, the Supreme Court 
took issue with the Federal Circuit’s justification for its general rule to 
issue injunctive relief: protecting the right to exclude others from using 
the patentee’s property.147  In the Court’s words, “the creation of a right 
is distinct from the provision of remedies for violation of that right.”148  
The Court recognized that patents must be imbued with the attributes 
of personal property under 35 U.S.C. § 261, but those attributes are 
qualified by the Patent Act, including the judicial discretion to issue 
injunctive relief.149   
Notwithstanding that both the district court and the Federal Circuit 
noted the discretion a trial judge has to issue a permanent injunction,150 
the Supreme Court framed its decision as reaffirming so-called 
“traditional equitable considerations” while rejecting rules that 
“injunction[s] automatically follow” infringement.151  In its place, the 
Supreme Court held:  
[A] plaintiff must satisfy a four-factor test before a 
court may grant [injunctive] relief. A plaintiff must 
demonstrate: (1) that is has suffered irreparable injury; 
 
143. Id. 
144. Id.  
145. MercExchange, L.L.C. v. eBay, Inc., 401 F.3d 1323, 1338–39 (Fed. Cir. 2005).  The 
Supreme Court itself even noted these exceptions in its decision.  eBay, 547 U.S. at 394. 
146. Id. at 393–94. 
147. Id. at 392. 
148. Id. 
149. Id.  
150. MercExchange, L.L.C. v. eBay, Inc., 275 F. Supp. 2d 695, 711 (E.D. Va. 2003), 
noted that “[i]ssuance of injunctive relief against [defendants] is governed by traditional 
equitable principles, which require consideration of” substantially the same four factors the 
Supreme Court set forth in the eBay.  547 U.S. at 391. The Federal Circuit decision states that 
this discretion is rarely invoked, MercExchange, 401 F.3d at 1338 (quoting Rite-Hite Corp. v. 
Kelley, Inc., 56 F.3d 1538, 1547 (Fed. Cir. 1995)), but its low frequency of use does not detract 
from the courts’ raw power to deny injunctive relief with the exercise of such discretion.    
151. Id. at 392–93.  
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(2) that remedies available at law, such as monetary 
damages, are inadequate to compensate for that injury; 
(3) that, considering the balance of hardships between 
the plaintiff and defendant, a remedy in equity is 
warranted; and (4) that the public interest would not be 
disserved by a permanent injunction.152 
The Supreme Court vacated the Federal Circuit’s judgment and 
remanded the case to the district court to apply these four factors.153   
4.  The District Court’s Construing the eBay Holding as a Rejection of 
the Presumption of Irreparable Harm 
eBay’s four-factor test unsurprisingly reappeared at the Eastern 
District of Virginia after the Supreme Court remanded the case.154  In 
particular, the district court reconsidered whether the presumption of 
irreparable harm remained after the Supreme Court’s decision.155   
Though the district court recognized that “the Supreme Court’s 
opinion does not squarely address” this issue, the district court then 
pointed to subsequent lower-court caselaw to hold that “such [a] 
presumption no longer exists.”156  Alongside these cases cited is a U.S. 
Supreme Court decision, Amoco Product Co. v. Village of Gambell, 
which stated that a presumption of irreparable harm for determining 
whether a preliminary injunction will issue “is contrary to traditional 
equitable principles and has no basis in” the Alaska Nation Interest 
Lands Conversation Act, 16 U.S.C. § 3120(a).157  As to the U.S. Supreme 
Court’s eBay decision, the district court did point to language contained 
therein that “require[s] the plaintiff to demonstrate that it has suffered 
irreparable injury.”158   
Pursuant to this precedent, the district court ultimately rejected the 
presumption of irreparable harm and placed the onus on the plaintiff to 
prove such injury.159 
 
 
152. Id. at 391.  
153. Id. at 394. 
154. Id.  
155. MercExchange, L.L.C. v. eBay, Inc., 500 F. Supp. 2d 556, 568 (E.D. Va. 2007). 
156. Id. at 568–69 (citing z4 Techs., Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., 434 F. Supp. 2d 437, 440 
(E.D. Tex. 2006); Paice LLC v. Toyota Motor Corp., No. 2:04-CV-211-DF, 2006 WL 2385139, 
at *4 (E.D. Tex. 2006); Amoco Prod. Co. v. Vill. Of Gambell, 480 U.S. 531, 545 (1987)). 
157. Amoco, 480 U.S. at 544–45, cited in MercExchange, 500 F. Supp. 2d at 568–69.  
158. MercExchange, 500 F. Supp. 2d at 569 (emphasis in the original).  
159. Id.  
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B.  The Split of Authority Grappling with the Presumption after eBay v. 
MercExchange  
Facially, the Supreme Court’s decision and the district court’s 
rejection of the presumption of irreparable harm on remand deal 
principally with patent infringement, but the equitable principles 
articulated in eBay have been applied to copyright infringement cases as 
well.  However, the Supreme Court in one paragraph of eBay noted that 
its decision is “consistent with [its] treatment of injunctions under the 
Copyright Act.”160  Though the Supreme Court recognized that “a 
copyright holder possesses ‘the right to exclude others from using his 
property,’”161 the Supreme Court also expressed that it has repeatedly 
“rejected invitations to replace traditional equitable considerations with 
a rule than injunction automatically follows a determination that a 
copyright has been infringed.”162  As such, the federal courts have by and 
large treated eBay as applying to copyright infringement cases.163   
The lower courts, however, have split on the issue of whether eBay 
abrogates the presumption of irreparable harm in copyright cases.  
1. Cases Rejecting the Presumption of Irreparable Harm 
The most substantial opinion taking this position came down from 
the Central District of California in Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, Inc. 
v. Grokster, Ltd.164  Like the MercExchange district court’s decision, the 
MGM court relied first upon the Supreme Court decision’s language 
that “Plaintiffs ‘must demonstrate’ the presence of the traditional 
factors.”165  Parroting MercExchange even further is MGM’s reliance on 
the Amoco decision, noting additionally that the Supreme Court “in 
eBay[] cited Amoco twice . . . first[] as support for the four factors that a 
 
160. eBay, 547 U.S. at 392.  
161. Id. (quoting Fox Film Corp. v. Doyal, 286 U.S. 123, 127 (1932)).  
162. eBay, 547 U.S. at 392–93 (citing New York Times Co. v. Tasini, 533 U.S. 483, 505 
(2002); Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, inc., 510 U.S. 569, 578 (1994); Dun v. Lumbermen’s 
Credit Ass’n, 209 U.S. 20, 23–24 (1908)).  
163. Thomas F. Cotter, Fair Use and Copyright Overenforcement, 93 IOWA L. REV. 
1271, 1292 n.54 (2008) (“Following the Supreme Court’s decision in eBay, courts have begun 
to apply the traditional four-factor test for determining whether to award injunctive relief in 
patent and copyright actions.”); e.g., Christopher Phelps & Assocs., LLC v. Galloway, 492 
F.3d 532 (4th Cir. 2007) (“The Supreme Court [in eBay] reaffirmed the traditional showing 
that a plaintiff must make to obtain a permanent injunction in any type of case, including a 
patent or copyright case.”); Propet USA, Inc. v. Shugart, No. C06-0186-MAT, 2007 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 94979, at *4–5 (E.D. Wash. 2007).  
164. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayers Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 518 F. Supp. 2d 1197 
(C.D. Cal. 2007).  
165. Id. at 1211 (quoting eBay, 547 U.S. at 391).  
280 MARQUETTE INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 15:1 
 
plaintiff must demonstrate before district courts can grant a permanent 
injunction[] and second[] to help justify the proposition that departure 
from traditional equity practice should not be “lightly implied.”166  Given 
the lack of language in 17 U.S.C. § 502(a) purporting to revise these 
traditional principles, MGM ultimately placed the burden on plaintiffs 
to prove irreparable harm.167   
MGM tried to ease its rejection of the presumption by stating that 
“[i]n run-of-the-mill copyright litigation, such proof should not be 
difficult to establish.”168  That being said, the court still abrogated the 
rule that the threat of continuing infringement is sufficient to establish 
irreparable harm because “future copyright infringement can always be 
redressed via damages.”169 
Designer Skin v. S & L Vitamins, though taking the same position as 
MGM on the burden of proof issue,170 pointed to friction between 
MGM’s treatment of the future infringement and Chief Justice Roberts’ 
concurrence in eBay.  Though MGM’s view was that future 
infringement cannot alone establish irreparable harm, Chief Justice 
Roberts, as the Designer Skin court reported, pointed to “the difficulty 
of protecting a right to exclude through monetary remedies that allow 
an infringer to use” the plaintiff’s property.171  As a prudential matter, 
Designer Skin then stated in dicta that future infringement can satisfy 
the first factor of the eBay test.172  Nonetheless, the Designer Skin court 
expressly declined to hold whether future infringement by itself could 
establish irreparable harm, because the case presented facts 
demonstrating irreparable harm in addition to possible future 
infringement.173  As to future infringement, the court noted its lack of 
confidence in the defendant’s assertions that it will cease and desist its 
infringing activity,174 citing Broadcast Music v. Blueberry Hill Family 
Restaurants, for the proposition that a court may “infer[] a threat of 
future infringement from the ‘thin excuses’ the defendant made when 
 
166. MGM, 518 F. Supp. 2d at 1213–14 (quoting eBay, 547 U.S. at 391 (citing Amoco 
Prod. Co. v. Vill. of Gambell, 480 U.S. 531, 542 (1987))).  
167. MGM, 518 F. Supp. 2d at 1214.  
168. Id. at 1215 (quoting 6 PATRY, supra note 8, § 22:74). 
169. MGM, 518 F. Supp. 2d at 1215. 
170. Designer Skin, LLC v. S & L Vitamins, Inc., 88 U.S.P.Q.2D (BNA) 1679, 1683 (D. 
Ariz. 2008). 
171. Id. (quoting eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388, 395 (2006) 
(Roberts, C.J., concurring)).  
172. Designer Skin, 88 U.S.P.Q.2D at 1683 (quoting and citing eBay, 547 U.S. at 391–
93) (citations omitted).  
173. Designer Skin, 88 U.S.P.Q.2D at 1683.  
174. Id at 1684. 
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confronted with infringement allegations.”175  Adding to the threat of 
irreparable harm was the difficulty of proving damages where there was 
no market for licenses for the copyrights.176  Thus, the court determined 
that the first eBay factor was satisfied.177 
Furthermore, the Northern District of California in Apple v. Psystar 
allied itself with MGM and Designer Skin in holding that “there is no 
presumption of irreparable harm with respect to permanent injunctions” 
in copyright cases.178  This case also did not address the issue of future 
infringement treated above, and the court need not have decided it in 
any event.  Apple demonstrated that it would suffer irreparable harm in 
the way of harm to its “brand, business reputation, . . . goodwill[,] . . . 
competitive position[,] and market share,” as well as harm stemming 
from the fact that “Psystar’s illegal acts have enabled and will continue 
to enable third parties to infringe Apple’s copyrights.”179 
2. Cases Retaining the Presumption of Irreparable Harm 
Other courts have generally treated the presumption in the 
permanent injunction context in a more summary manner, stating 
simply that the presumption continues to apply after eBay.  One 
decision, Microsoft v. McGee, held that, “[w]ith regard to the first [eBay] 
factor, ‘copyright infringement is presumed to give rise to irreparable 
injury.’”180  That one sentence completely covers that court’s treatment 
of that rule.  Similarly, UMG Recordings v. Blake reaffirmed the rule 
predating eBay that “permanent injunctions are generally granted 
where liability has been established and there is a threat of continuing 
infringement.”181  After reciting the eBay factors,182 the court then held 
that “[i]rreparable injury is presumed when a plaintiff succeeds on the 
merits.”183   
At the end of 2009, the District of Massachusetts in Sony BMG 
 
175. Broad. Music, Inc. v. Blueberry Hill Family Rests., 899 F. Supp. 474, 483 (D. Nev. 
1995). 
176. Designer Skin, 88 U.S.P.Q.2D at 1684. 
177. Id. 
178. Apple Inc. v. Psystar Corp., 673 F. Supp. 2d 943, 948 (N.D. Cal. 2009).  
179. Id.  
180. Microsoft Corp. v. McGee, 490 F. Supp. 2d 874, 882 (S.D. Ohio 2007) (quoting 
Capitol Records, Inc. v. Zahn, No. 3:06-0212, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11426, at *10 (M.D. 
Tenn. 2007)).  The Capital Records case, though decided after eBay, made no mention of the 
four factors the Supreme Court set forth.  
181. UMG Recordings, Inc. v. Blake, No. 5:06-CV-00120-BR, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
46414, *6 (E.D. Va. 2007) 
182. Id. at *6–7.  
183. Id. at *7.  
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Music Entertainment v. Tenenbaum, likewise, named those four factors184 
and then held that “[o]nce copyright infringement is established, 
irreparable injury is generally presumed.”185  The Sony court noted in 
passing, additionally, that an injunction would have the effect of 
“[r]equiring defendant to refrain from future copyright violations.”186 
III.  USING THE TRADITIONAL RULE AS A BLUEPRINT: WHY THE 
COURTS SHOULD CONTINUE TO PRESUME IRREPARABLE HARM 
The lack of reasoning buttressing the decisions upholding the 
presumption of irreparable harm does not invariably mean that their 
position is entirely without merit.  As even the MGM court recognized, 
the Supreme Court did not address whether its eBay decision intended 
to abrogate the presumption of irreparable harm.187  This much is true 
both explicitly and implicitly from the Court’s eBay opinions.  Because 
eBay’s holding and analysis is broad enough to allow for a rebuttable 
presumption of irreparable harm, the courts should apply the 
presumption to avail themselves of its theoretical rationale, prudential 
benefits, and historical roots.  The following sections treat these 
justifications in turn.  
A.  Protecting Copyright’s Property Right to Exclude 
As one practice manual suggests, “[t]he presumption of irreparable 
harm in copyright cases arises because copyright infringement 
constitutes an invasion of the copyright holder’s right to exclusive use of 
his work.”188  Injunctive relief thus ensures that rights granted by the 
 
184. Sony BMG Music Entertainment v. Tenenbaum, 93 U.S.P.Q.2D (BNA) 1867, 
1868 (D. Mass. Dec. 7, 2009). 
185. Id. 
186. Id.  
187. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 518 F. Supp. 2d 1197, 1211 
(C.D. Cal. 2007). 
188. 5 LESTER HORWITZ & ETHAN HORWITZ EDS., INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 
COUNSELING AND LITIGATION § 65.07[3] (2002) (citing Dealer Advertising Dev., Inc. v. 
Barbara Allen Fin. Advertising, Inc., 197 U.S.P.Q. 611 (W.D. Mich. 1977)); Thought Factory, 
Inc. v. Idea Factory, Inc., 203 U.S.P.Q. 331 (C.D. Cal. 1978); Cynthia Designs, Inc. v. Robert 
Zentall, Inc., 416 F. Supp. 510 (S.D.N.Y. 1976)).  This justification also finds support in patent 
cases predating eBay Inc v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388 (2006) and MercExchange, 
L.L.C. v. eBay, Inc., 500 F. Supp. 2d 556 (E.D. Va. 2007).  Continental Paper Bag Co. v. 
Eastern Paper Bag Co., 210 U.S. 405, 425 (1908) (“[P]atents are property, and entitled to the 
same rights and sanctions as other property.”); Richardson v. Suzuki Motor Co., 868 F.2d 
1226, 1246 (Fed. Cir. 1989) (“Infringement having been established, it is contrary to the laws 
of property, of which patent law partakes, to deny the patentee’s right to exclude others from 
use of his property.”); Connell v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 722 F.2d 1542, 1548 (Fed. Cir. 1983) 
(“A patent is a form of property right, and the right to exclude recognized in a patent is but 
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Copyright Act itself remain “exclusive.”189  
How to characterize these rights’ exclusivity turns on two points.  
First is copyright’s nature as a monopoly.  To be sure, copyrights are 
suggested to be such in the constitutional dispatch of authority to 
Congress to pass legislation on copyright matters: the Intellectual 
Property Clause of the U.S. Constitution.190  This clause allows Congress 
to grant an “exclusive [r]ight”  to authors of copyrightable works.191  
Furthermore, the Copyright Act in multiple headings refers to 
“exclusive rights,”192 most explicitly in the section that creates the 
exclusive rights themselves, 17 U.S.C. § 106.  
A monopoly on these rights ceases to be when parties other than 
copyright owners exercise them.  The second point, then, is how these 
exclusive rights can be enforced.  The Copyright Act predominantly 
counteracts this threat to the copyright monopoly with private rights of 
action created for the owners of potentially infringed copyrights.193  
Thus, aside from the limited criminal sanctions aimed at punishing 
limited categories of infringement,194 copyright owners are charged with 
 
the essence of the concept of property.”).  To be sure, the Patent Act of 1952 itself 
conceptualizes patent as “personal property.”  35 U.S.C. § 261.  There is no analogous statute 
explicitly characterizing copyright as personal property, but that nature is readily implied 
from the Act’s creation of a right to exclude in 17 U.S.C. § 106.  Adam Mossoff, The Use and 
Abuse of IP at the Birth of the Administrative State, 157 U. PA. L. REV. 2001 (2009); Thomas 
W. Merrill, Property and the Right to Exclude, 77 NEB. L. REV. 730, 730 (1998) (“[T]he right 
to exclude others is more than just ‘one of the most essential’ constituents of property—it is 
the sine qua non.” (emphasis in the original)). 
189. 17 U.S.C. § 106 (2006).  
190. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. 
191. Id. 
192. The Copyright Act sets forth limitations on this monopoly, including the fair use 
defense, 17 U.S.C. § 107, and the public’s right to cover sound recordings, 17 U.S.C. § 114.  
Those particular rules, however, do not operate as exceptions to the copyright monopoly; 
they merely demarcate the boundaries of the exclusive rights described in § 106.  To be sure, 
the headings preceding these statutes speak of the “limitations on exclusive rights,” §§ 107–
112, 117, 119, 121–122, or the “scope of [the] exclusive rights,” §§ 113–115, 118, 120.  Thus, 
these rules merely define the monopoly itself, rather than providing exceptions to them.  As 
for licenses, both compulsory and voluntary through contractual arrangement, these 
exceptions prove the general monopoly rule to the extent that, absent such licensing, the 
monopoly would operate as the default rule.  Licensing behavior also mimics the nature of 
copyrights as rights to exclude, as one would enjoy with tangible property, discussed infra. 
193. Section 501 creates the traditional copyright infringement cause of action when a 
defendant exercises and thus violates one of the exclusive rights that the owner enjoys.  Title 
17 of the U.S. Code also provides for civil liability when an individual circumvents an owner’s 
use of digital rights management, § 1203, when an Internet service provider does not 
adequately comply with a Digital Millennium Copyright Act takedown notice, see § 512(c)(1), 
and when a violation of an exclusive right provided in the Semiconductor Chip Protection 
Act occurs, § 910.  
194. 17 U.S.C. § 506; see 18 U.S.C. § 2319 (2006).  
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enforcing their own copyrights.   
Put another way, the burden falls on copyright owners to maintain 
their statutory monopolies by preventing others from exercising the 
rights granted to owners by § 106.  As such, the Copyright Act treats 
exclusive rights as rights to exclude195 others from reproducing, 
distributing, publicly displaying, publicly performing, or creating 
derivatives of a copyrighted work,196 not unlike the conventional “sole 
and despotic dominion . . . in total exclusion of the right of any other 
individual”197 tangible property owners enjoy.198  
Similarly to tangible property owners, copyright owners face a 
potential policing problem when the threat of future violations arises.  
As noted above, when a defendant exercises one of the rights 
enumerated in 17 U.S.C. § 106, those rights cease to be exclusive in fact.  
Though damages may account for the losses resulting from the 
infringement199 and profits that defendants may have garnered from 
their infringing activities200 and may deter future infringement by making 
the cost of that activity prohibitive,201 a mere damage award runs the risk 
of judicially licensing infringement where the Copyright Act otherwise 
has not provided for compulsory licenses.  Even with orders issuing the 
maximum in statutory damage awards, defendants may in some cases 
find themselves better off infringing and paying for the resulting damage 
 
195. Oppenheimer, supra note 15 (defining exclusive rights to be “rights to exclude,” as 
opposed to “all-inclusive rights”).   
196. 17 U.S.C. § 106. 
197. 2 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *1, *2. 
198. William F. Patry suggests that copyright should not be treated as a property right 
but rather “as a limited regulatory privilege created for the sole purpose of promoting the 
progress of science, and not economically benefitting copyright holders.” 6 PATRY, supra 
note 15, § 22:1.50.  Though copyright law’s overarching and constitutional purpose is “to 
promote the progress of science and the useful arts,” U.S. CONST. Art. I, § 8, cl. 8, Patry’s 
conception of copyright distends the plain language of both the Copyright Act and the 
Constitution’s Intellectual Property Clause.  Both sources by their terms do not create 
privileges for authors of original works but rather grant “exclusive rights.”  Id.; § 106.  That 
exclusivity, enforceable by infringement suits, gives copyrights the property-esque nature that 
presents the same risks of perpetual policing, discussed infra.  See Thomas W. Merrill, 
Property and the Right to Exclude, 77 NEB. L. REV. 730, 730 (1998) (“[T]he right to exclude 
others is more than just ‘one of the most essential’ constituents of property—it is the sine qua 
non.” (emphasis in the original)); but see Adam Mossoff, The Use and Abuse of IP in the 
Birth of the Administrative State, 157 U. PA. L. REV. 2001, 2015 (2009) (citing Felix S. Cohen, 
Dialogue on Private Property, 9 RUTGERS L. REV. 357, 374 (1954) (treating property as state-
granted rights, implying that governments retain the authority to divest property owners of 
those rights)).  
199. 17 U.S.C. § 504(a). 
200. Id. 
201. Unicity Music, Inc. v. Omni Commc’ns, Inc., 844 F. Supp. 504, 510 (E.D. Ark. 
1994) (explaining the deterrent effect of statutory damages under 17 U.S.C. § 504(c)(1)).  
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judgments, particularly if the defendant is a large corporation that can 
easily bear the costs of these judgments.   
Facing such resilient defendants, copyright owners would find 
themselves constantly litigating the infringement of their exclusive 
rights.  As Justice Story framed this issue, “if no other remedy could be 
given in cases of patents and copyrights than an action at law for 
damages, the inventor or author might be ruined by the necessity of 
perpetual litigation, without ever being able to have a final 
establishment of his rights.”202   
Permanent relief addresses these concerns, providing the finality 
missing from inadequately deterrent damage judgments and retaining 
copyrights’ exclusivity.  
B.  Judicial Distrust of Defendant’s Assertions of Voluntary Cessation 
With threats of future infringement impeding copyrights from being 
exclusive to their owners, the courts have shown their disinclination to 
give defendants’ claims that they have stopped their infringing activity 
the benefit of the doubt.  For example, in BMG Music v. Gonzales, 
Judge Frank Easterbrook writing for the Seventh Circuit reaffirmed 
that injunctive relief is generally appropriate to address a threat of 
future copyright infringement.203  Though the defendant in that case 
“downloaded more than 1,370 copyrighted songs during a few weeks 
and kept them on her computer until she was caught,”204 she argued on 
appeal that “she ha[d] learned her lesson, ha[d] dropped her broadband 
access to the Internet, and [was] unlikely to download copyrighted 
material again.”205  Judge Easterbrook did not buy it.  Instead, Judge 
Easterbrook held that “[a] private party’s discontinuation of unlawful 
conduct does not make the dispute moot.  An injunction remains 
appropriate to ensure that the misconduct does not recur as soon as the 
case ends.”206  
On this point, Judge Easterbrook is not alone.  The D.C. Circuit 
treated a defendant’s similar attempt to avoid the mandate of a 
permanent injunction in Walt Disney Co. v. Powell.207  Mimicking the 
BMG Music defendant, the Walt Disney defendant “argue[d] that since 
he voluntarily ceased infringing Disney’s copyrights, there is no basis to 
 
202. 2 STORY, supra note 19, at 931.  
203. BMG Music v. Gonzalez, 430 F.3d 888, 893 (7th Cir. 2005).  
204. Id. at 889.  
205. Id. at 893. 
206. Id. (citing United States v. W.T. Grant Co., 345 U.S. 629 (1953)). 
207. Walt Disney Co. v. Powell, 897 F.2d 565 (D.C. Cir. 1990). 
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assume that he will infringe them again in the future.”208  Like Judge 
Easterbrook, the district judge below did not believe the defendant:  
The judge concluded that . . . Powell simply took the action that best 
suited him at the time; he was caught red-handed, thus as the illegality 
of his affairs faced increasing exposure, Powell suddenly reformed.  
Consequently, the judge found it not unlikely that Powell would attempt 
to infringe Disney’s copyrights in the future.209 
On this evidence, the D.C. Circuit affirmed the permanent 
injunction entered by this district court.210   
However, the Walt Disney court preceded this discussion with 
another case from the D.C. Circuit “stating the converse of this rule.”211  
This case, Reader’s Digest v. Conservative Digest, held, as noted above 
in Part I, “When a defendant has ceased its infringing conduct and 
shows no inclination to repeat the offense, a court may not issue a 
permanent injunction.”212   
These dueling doctrines, however, further justify presuming 
irreparable harm.  Under the Reader’s Digest rule, one could conceive 
of situations where a defendant convincingly demonstrates that they 
have reformed and will not infringe the plaintiff’s copyrights again.  
Aside from those theoretical possibilities, however, the traditional 
stance is to scrutinize these statements with skepticism.213  With this 
distrust, it is no accident that the courts in BMG Music and Powell 
noted that the threat of future infringement in passing, then shifting 
their focus to closely examining the defendant’s claims of personal 
 
208. Id. at 568. 
209. Id. (citations and quotation marks omitted).  
210. Id. 
211. Id. at 568, n.2. 
212. Reader’s Digest Ass’n, Inc. v. Conservative Digest, Inc., 821 F.2d 800, 807 (D.C. 
Cir. 1987).  That said, in another portion of the decision, as discussed supra Part I.C., the D.C. 
Circuit was willing to enjoin the defendant’s use of two infringing covers despite no 
demonstrated inclination to infringe Reader’s Digest’s copyrights any further.  Id. at 807.  
213. This skepticism also motivates the mootness doctrine.  One case cited by Judge 
Easterbrook in BMG Music, 430 F.3d at 893, states, “[V]oluntary cessation of allegedly illegal 
conduct does not deprive the tribunal of power to hear and determine the case.”  W.T. Grant 
Co., 345 U.S. at 632.  The Supreme Court justified this rule primarily for two reasons: “The 
defendant is free to return to his old ways.  This, together with a public interest in having the 
legality of the practices settled, militates against a mootness conclusion.”  Id.  In line with the 
traditional rule in copyright cases, defendants bear a heavy burden to prove in detail that they 
will not restart the conduct they ceased.  W.T. Grant, 345 U.S. at 632; DeJohn v. Temple 
Univ., 537 F.3d 301, 309 (3d Cir. 2008); Vencor, Inc. v. Webb, 33 F.3d 840, 843–44 (7th Cir. 
1994); 15 JAMES WM. MOORE, MOORE’S FEDERAL PRACTICE § 101.99[2] (3rd ed. 2010); 13C 
CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT, ARTHUR R. MILLER, EDWARD H. COOPER, FEDERAL PRACTICE 
AND PROCEDURE § 3533.5 (3rd ed. 2008). 
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reform. 
By placing the burden of proof on the defendant, a judge can more 
accurately scrutinize defendants’ assertions that they will cease 
infringing a plaintiff’s copyrights.  Shouldering the plaintiffs with the 
burden means that the defendant could prevail only by rebutting the 
plaintiff’s case.214  Though affirmative statements that the defendant will 
not infringe may be relatively more persuasive, defendants could 
theoretically get a motion denied by stating that the plaintiff’s 
predictions of irreparable harm are unsound.215  By placing the burden 
of proof on defendants, courts then will only deny relief if defendants 
make a prima facie affirmative case that their infringing activities have 
permanently ceased and, therefore, will not violate a copyright owner’s 
right to exclude.  
C.  The Interdependent Relationship between Rights and Remedies 
Though eBay tried to decouple “the creation of a right” from “the 
remedies for violations of that right”216 and is correct to do so to the 
extent that one cannot equate a right with a remedy, the substance of 
rights asserted in court often define the nature and scope of remedies 
when the right is found to be violated.217  This interrelationship between 
rights and remedies comes to the fore in a case like Texaco v. Pennzoil218 
where a plaintiff has the choice between suing in tort or contract.  
Should the plaintiff sue in contract, the damages recoverable would 
 
214. See, e.g., KP Permanent Make-Up, Inc. v. Lasting Impression I, Inc., 543 U.S. 111, 
114 (2004). 
215. Returning to the mootness doctrine, courts have held that a plaintiff’s failure to 
demonstrate that the defendants’ voluntary cessation of illegal conduct is merely temporary is 
not enough for a defendant to have a case dismissed as nonjusticiable.  15 MOORE, supra note 
213 (citing FTC v. Affordable Media, LLC, 179 F.3d  1228, 1237–38 (9th Cir. 1999)).  The 
Supreme Court has also stated that, with regard to a judge’s remedial discretion, such as 
whether injunctive relief is appropriate, the burden shifts to the plaintiff to demonstrate that 
such relief is needed beyond “the mere possibility which serves to keep the case alive.”  W.T. 
Grant, 345 U.S. at 633; 13C WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 213.  That said, presuming 
irreparable harm does not contradict this principle.  A rebuttable presumption does not 
remove the plaintiff’s burden to prove that injunctive relief generally is appropriate because 
the plaintiff still must sufficiently demonstrate that the three other eBay factors support 
permanent relief.  The presumption only relieves plaintiffs of the burden of proving the first 
factor. 
216. Id.  
217. Douglas Laycock argued, using a trespass hypothetical, that “remedies law does 
not change Neighbor’s underlying obligation to leave Owner’s trees alone, so it is not easily 
thought of as substantive . . . .  It is something in between; it is the means by which substantive 
rights are give effect.”  DOUGLAS LAYCOCK, MODERN AMERICAN REMEDIES: CASES AND 
MATERIALS 1–2 (3d ed. 2002). 
218. Texaco, Inc. v. Pennzoil Co., 729 S.W.2d 768 (Tex. App. 1987). 
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generally be limited to those that would seek to replicate the position 
the plaintiff would have occupied had a breach not occurred.219  If that 
same plaintiff were to sue in tort, under the same general operative 
facts, the opportunities for greater amounts in consequential damages 
and punitive damages otherwise not available under contract law would 
open up.220   
This anomaly arises because each theory protects different interests: 
returning to the Texaco example, contract law generally ensures that 
promisees are protected from the pecuniary loss of their bargain,221 
whereas tort law seeks to shift the cost of injury resulting from 
sanctionable conduct from plaintiffs to the tortfeasor that caused the 
injury.222  Lest these and other interests go partially unprotected or 
overprotected, courts must structure their remedies around each 
theory’s substance.  
This relationship between rights and remedies is a reciprocal one: 
though a court-ordered remedy often does not strictly speaking alter the 
substantive rights violated,223 the proper remedy will ultimately 
determine how and sometimes whether the right is properly 
vindicated.224  As noted above, copyright owners hold a bundle of 
exclusive rights under 17 U.S.C. § 106, and these rights may cease to be 
exclusive where the Copyright Act does not so provide when infringing 
behavior continues.225  Absent such relief, a damage award may 
effectively license the behavior, telling defendants, as Justice Scalia 
mentioned twice during the United States’ amicus argument in eBay, 
that they can feel free to infringe a plaintiff’s property rights to the 
 
219. See, e.g., U.C.C. § 2-708(2) (2010).  
220. Texaco, 729 S.W.2d at 859.  Sometimes, this disparity in the available damages is 
staggering.  One extreme example lies in the astronomical judgment affirmed in Texaco.  
Under the contract, Pennzoil would have likely been awarded the market value of the stock 
in the merger agreement: about $500 million.  See LAYCOCK, supra note 147, at 72.  The 
theory Pennzoil actually pursued, tortious interference with a contract, yielded the now-
infamous $10.53 billion dollar award.  Texaco, 729 S.W.2d at 784.  
221. RICHARD A. LORD, WILLISTON ON CONTRACTS § 64:1 (2010).   
222. PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 85 (Keeton et al. eds., 5th ed. 
1984).  There is some authority suggesting that the measure of damages in contract 
interference cases should be the same as those for a breach of contract, e.g., McNutt Oil & 
Refining Co. D’Ascoli, 79 Ariz. 28, 281 P.2d 966 (1955), but this is not the majority rule, see 2 
DOBBS, supra note 63, § 6.6(2).  
223. LAYCOCK, supra note 153. 
224. 2 HIGH, supra note 19 (describing purpose of equity jurisdiction in copyright 
infringement suits as “making effectual the legal right, which can not [sic] be done by an 
action for damages”); 5 HORWITZ & HORWITZ, supra note 188. 
225. 5 HORWITZ & HORWITZ, supra note 188.  
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extent that they are willing and able to do so,226 impeding a plaintiff’s 
copyrights from further reaching their theoretical exclusivity. 
D.  Conserving Judicial Resources by Recognizing Trends 
The emphasis this Comment’s prescriptive model places on 
copyright’s nature as an exclusive right is not undercut by eBay’s 
language rejecting that the “statutory right to exclude alone justifies [a] 
general rule in favor of permanent injunctive relief.”227  Though the right 
to exclude is central to providing a normative basis for how permanent 
injunctions vindicate infringed copyrights’ exclusivity, those rights are 
not the only justification for the presumption of irreparable harm or 
normally granting permanent relief in copyright cases.   
The presumption also finds worth in its conservation of judicial 
resources.  In cases where irreparable harm will normally flow from 
infringement, “presuming [irreparable harm] once [infringement] is 
shown saves everyone time and expense.  Allowing the presumption to 
be rebutted increases accuracy in the presumably small set of cases” that 
deviate from the norm.228   
E.  Allowing General Rules while Prohibiting Categorical Rules 
Though some decisions have latched onto the Supreme Court’s 
apparent rejection of general rules to justify eliminating the 
presumption, the court cannot have adopted a wholesale rejection of all 
general rules.  Throughout the decision, the Court took issue with the 
Federal Circuit’s nearly “categorical” rule that permanent injunctions 
would issue absent a public interest reason to the contrary.229  In other 
words, the Federal Circuit’s test conclusively presumed irreparable 
harm; the test for permanent relief categorically treated all cases where 
infringement is established as giving rise to irreparable harm.  A 
rebuttable presumption, conversely, accounts for the outlier cases where 
damages are appropriate to redress infringement.  By giving defendants 
a chance to show that a copyright owner can be made whole through a 
damage recovery only, a rebuttable presumption thus cannot be 
properly termed an errant categorical rule.   
 
226. Transcript of Oral Argument at 33, eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 
388 (2006) (No. 05-130). 
227. eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388, 392 (2006).  
228. David McGowan, Business Law Forum: Intellectual Property Remedies: 
Irreparable Harm, 14 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 577, 582 (2010). 
229. eBay, 547 U.S. at 393–94; MercExchange, L.L.C. v. eBay, Inc., 401 F.3d 1323, 1338 
(Fed. Cir. 2005). 
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Furthermore, merely general rules are practically inevitable.230  To 
be sure, a central tenet of common law jurisprudence is to apply 
preexisting generalized rules to a specific set of circumstances, to apply 
the precedent created by the first application to the next case, and so 
on.231  Also characteristic of common law development of legal rules is 
that cases will treat similar cases similarly.  Chief Justice Roberts noted 
as much in oral argument,232 and Justice Kennedy recognized in his 
concurrence that “[t]he lesson of the historical practice . . . is most 
helpful and instructive when the circumstances of a case bear substantial 
parallels to litigation the courts have confronted before.”233   
F.  Following the History and Tradition of Equity Practice 
The history and tradition that eBay pushed the courts to consider 
generally is not characterized by courts laboriously marching through 
equitable factors in copyright infringement suits.   
In fact, a late-nineteenth-century treatise claims that equitable 
remedies are “superior[]” to actions at law to vindicate copyrights, 
without suggesting that there may be cases when the courts should deny 
injunctive relief.234  In its words, “a court of equity is manifestly the 
better forum for the protection of a copyright, since a court of law 
cannot afford as ample redress . . . for the prevention of a threatened or 
anticipated violation in the future.”235  Echoing Justice Story, the High 
treatise also argued that equity can “prevent a multiplicity of suits” and 
“vexatious litigation.”236  Interposed with these justifications for 
injunctive relief is a facially unqualified statement that “the purpose of 
making effectual the legal right” of copyright “can not [sic] be done by 
 
230. H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 121 (1961) (arguing that the law’s 
“successful operation over vast areas of social life depends on a widely diffused capacity to 
recognize particular acts, things, and circumstances as instances of the general classifications 
which the law makes”).  Though Hart suggests that “the law must predominantly, but by no 
means exclusively, refer to classes of . . . things,” these specialized rules may refer to rules 
described in one particular event, what Hart terms “precedent.”  Id. (emphasis in the 
original).  In fact, principled judicial decision-making depends on rules that can inform future 
cases, and Hart recognizes as much when he suggests a hypothetical where a child may ask 
“general questions” in trying to imitate one particular instance thought to convey a rule.  Id. 
at 122.  In order for those rules to retain relevance in future cases, they must have some room 
for generality.  Otherwise, judicial decision-making becomes completely ad-hoc.    
231. Id. at 121.  
232. Transcript of Oral Argument at 9, eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 
388 (2006) (No. 05-130).   
233. eBay, 547 U.S. at 396 (Kennedy, J., concurring).  
234. 2 HIGH, supra note 19. 
235. Id.  
236. Id. 
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an action for damages.”237  Nothing in this section speaks to multi-factor 
tests applied on a case-by-case basis.238 
Similar treatments appear in more recent scholarship examining 
English equity practice.  In What History Teaches Us About Copyright 
Injunctions and the Inadequate-Remedy-at-Law Requirement, H. Tomás 
Gómez-Arostegui found that “the inadequate-remedy-at-law 
requirement played no active role in deciding whether to issue a 
copyright injunction” in the English courts around 1789.239  Gómez-
Arostegui’s research found court records completely devoid of this 
issue, whether as requirements, arguments, or bases for rejecting 
requests for injunctive relief.240  Instead, “the historical record suggests 
that in copyright cases, legal remedies were deemed categorically 
inadequate.”241  Of greater moment is the connection between the 
inadequacy of legal remedies and the irreparable-harm rule that 
Gómez-Arostegui drew in the article’s conclusion.242 
These historical accounts appear to present three points of friction 
with current Supreme Court precedent.  First, as noted above, the 
Supreme Court expressly rejected the use of categorical rules.243  
Second, the absence of any treatment of irreparable injury in English 
court records used in Gómez-Arostegui’s article does not comport with 
the requirement that “a plaintiff seeking a permanent injunction must 
satisfy a four-factor test before a court may grant such relief.”244  Third, 
the Supreme Court stated in Amoco Product Co. v. Village of Gambell, 
a case cited by the Supreme Court in eBay,245 that a presumption of 
irreparable harm for the purpose of issuing preliminary injunctions “is 
contrary to traditional equitable principles and has no basis in 
ANILCA.”246   




239.  Gómez-Arostegui, supra note 23, at 1201.  
240. Id.   
241. Id. 
242. Id. at 1280.  In the introduction, Gómez-Arostegui interpreted this research as 
demonstrating that English practice around the time the Constitution was ratified is 
consistent with the rule that “if the injury complained of is copyright infringement, then the 
inadequacy of the legal remedies or ‘irreparable injury’ conclusively exists as a matter of 
law.”  Id. at 1200.  
243. eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388, 393–94 (2006). 
244. Id. at 391.  
245. Id. The MGM court also noted that eBay cited Amoco twice.  Metro-Goldwyn-
Mayer Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 518 F. Supp. 2d 1197, 1213–14 (C.D. Cal. 2007).  
246. Amoco Prod. Co. v. Vill. of Gambell, 480 U.S. 531, 544–45 (1987). 
292 MARQUETTE INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 15:1 
 
Supreme Court’s decisions on injunctive relief with how courts sitting in 
equity traditionally operated.  As to the first point, one court rightly 
noted that a presumption of irreparable harm does not create a 
categorical rule.247  Later courts can follow the MercExchange 2003 
district court decision and prescribe a rebuttable presumption of 
irreparable harm to avoid that result.248   
As to the second point, though courts have latched onto that 
language to locate a burden of proof, that language does not inevitably 
prescribe that result.  To be sure, the rule states that “a plaintiff . . . must 
satisfy a four-factor test,”249 not that the plaintiff “must prove” each 
factor.250  To be sure, a plaintiff aware of the eBay test will at the very 
least mention the issue in a motion for an injunction,251 and should the 
defendant resist an injunction, the plaintiff still desiring such relief will 
advance arguments demonstrating the four factors.  This is consistent 
with current practice: as the Nimmer treatise notes, “injunctive relief 
ordinarily is not granted absent any threat of continuing or additional 
infringements.”252  
As to the third point, though that sweeping language from Amoco’s 
seems to ring the death knell of any presumption of irreparable harm, 
and eBay seems to endorse some specific points of Amoco’s language,253 
eBay did not cite that phrase from Amoco.  The eBay Court had 
occasion to reject a presumption of irreparable harm used by the 
Eastern District of Virginia before the case’s life in the Federal Circuit 
and the Supreme Court.  Considering further that the presumption’s 
appearance in the oral argument before the Supreme Court, such an 
omission points toward the Supreme Court deciding not to resolve 
whether the presumption of irreparable harm survives its decision in 
 
247. Lennon v. Premise Media Corp., L.P., 556 F. Supp. 2d 310, 320 (S.D.N.Y. 2008) 
(“The presumption of irreparable harm in copyright infringement actions, unlike the rule 
addressed in eBay, does not require courts to impose an injunction following a determination 
of infringement.”). 
248. MercExchange, L.L.C. v. eBay Inc., 275 F. Supp. 2d 695, 712 (E.D. Va. 2003). 
249. eBay, 547 U.S. at 391.  
250. Contra 7 DONALD S. CHISUM, CHISUM ON PATENTS, § 20.04[2][c][ii] (Rev. Ed. 
2005) (defining this language as “squarely placing the burden of proof on the patent owner”).  
Chisum’s treatise recognizes a few sentences prior to this quotation, however, that the 
Supreme Court did not address the presumption of irreparable harm directly.  Id.   
251. ABA SECTION OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY, AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, 
ANNUAL REVIEW OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW DEVELOPMENTS: 2006–08 415, 417 
(George W. Jordan III et al. eds. 2009) (counseling plaintiffs to “prepare[] to demonstrate the 
four eBay factors, including how irreparable harm will result absent the requested relief”). 
252. 4 NIMMER, supra note 9, §14.06[B][1][a]. 
253. eBay, 547 U.S. at 391.  




This Comment began by pointing to permanent injunctions’ potent 
nature.  It is this nature that strongly counsels for the sound exercise of 
discretion by district judges in whether a permanent injunction should 
issue in a copyright infringement action.  Congress expressed an intent 
to confer such discretion in 17 U.S.C. § 502(a), and the Supreme Court 
aimed to effectuate this same purpose through eBay v. MercExchange.  
It is therefore up to the courts to exercise the discretion left to them 
soundly.  A presumption of irreparable harm provides one tool, tested 
by time and precedent, to determine when permanent injunctions are 
the most prudent remedy.  
 




254. Gómez-Arostegui, supra note 23, at 1208–09. (“Though the Amoco case is cited in 
eBay, it is not cited expressly for this proposition nor even implicitly by reference to the page 
in Amoco on which the proposition appears.  The omission is especially striking given that 
eBay pressed this very argument.”). 
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